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We argue that common knowledge, of the kind used in reasoning in law and
computing is best analyzed using a dialogue model of argumentation (Walton
& Krabbe 1995). In this model, implicit premises resting on common knowledge
are analyzed as endoxa or widely accepted opinions and generalizations
(Tardini 2005). We argue that, in this sense, common knowledge is not really
knowledge and/or belief of the epistemic kind studied in current epistemology.
This paper takes a different approach, defining it in relation to a common commitment
store of two participants in a rule-governed dialogue in which two parties
engage in rational argumentation (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; van Eemeren &
Grootendorst 2004).
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A theme of the paper is how arguments containing common
knowledge premises can be studied with the help of argumentation
schemes for arguments from generally accepted opinion and expert opinion. It
is argued that common knowledge is a species of provisional acceptance of a
premise that is not in dispute at a given point in a dialogue, but may later be
defeated as the discussion proceeds.
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